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年 (12月現在） 陸軍 海軍 合計
1931 （昭.6) 200 78 278 
1937 （昭.12) 459 134 593 
1938 （昭.13) 1,130 195 1,325 
1939 （昭.14) 1,240 180 1,420 
1940 （昭.15) 1,350 223 1,573 
1941 （昭.16) 2,100 311 2,411 
1942 （昭.17) 2,400 429 2,829 
1943 （昭.18) 2,900 706 3,608 
1944 （昭.19) 4,100 1,295 5,395 





























































































































































































































復員開始は 1938年2月9日の第一次から，同月 14,16日と続き， 12月28日の第 15次復

















類で検討していくことにした。 1 軍による帰還兵への呼びかけ， 2 憲兵司令部警務部長から

































































































































































は「国軍現下の状態は月 変後の情勢を受け軍紀 必しも 況にありと謂ひ難 亜‘
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Role of Ideological and Propaganda Operations in the Issues of 
Returning Japanese Soldiers after the Nanjing Massacre (1937): 
Gag Orders by the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Home Affairs 
GOMI Tomoe 
A large number of Japanese soldiers began to return their home in February 1938 after 
the Nanjing Massacre. The armed forces and the national government of Japan were very 
afraid that soldiers returning from China might mention to the Japanese civilians the 
horrors of the war, atrocity committed by soldiers, and the disciplinary disorder of the 
armed forces. While it was the national policy to continue the Sino-Japanese War, these 
pieces of information would certainly be the major obstacle of continuing the war. Prior to 
their return, the armed forces imposed a news blackout, and Japanese civilians had no 
knowledge about the Nanjing massacre. The Japanese authorities immediately forbid the 
returning soldiers from mentioning the matter. To achieve the purpose, the national 
government secretly issued numerous notices to higher oficials of local governments and 
the Army Minister and high officials in charge of soldiers'affairs repeatedly aroused 
attention to words of returning soldiers. The military and police were in close cooperation 
in the nationwide surveillance of these returning soldiers. The military and police were 
very strict even for soldiers'personal effects brought back from China. This series of 
measures taken against the returning soldiers is collectively referred to as the "issues of 
returning soldiers" after the Nanjing Massacre. 
The purpose of this paper is, then, to consider what the armed forces and the Japanese 
authority were afraid of, how they responded to these crisis, and why they had to respond 
to these crisis, based on numerous sources. In the process of research, the author has 
learned that the high oficials of the Japanese armed forces even feared that they could not 
sustain their existence due to the disciplinary disorder at that time. 
To achieve the goal, it is necessary to grasp the whole historical process from the 
beginning of full-scale Sino-Japanese War to the demobilization of soldiers. While the large-
scale leak of information about the Nanjing Massacre and systematic movement against war 
never took place, the armed forces and the authority never loosened the surveillance but 
strengthened it until the end of the WWII. 
The Intelligence Department of the Cabinet realized the seriousness of the situation 
after the Nanjing Massacre, and strengthened the ideological and propaganda operations so 
that the Japanese people would be kept unified to cope with war that would bog down. In 
this process, HINO Ashihei, who was a soldier-writer just selected by the army information 
corps considerably contributed to the propaganda operations. 
Owing to the successful gag order, the great majority of Japanese people had not 
knowledge about the reality of the Nanjing Massacre. Furthermore, the great majority of 
returning soldiers did not mention it to their family members and their neighbors because 
of the awful content of it. Both the gag order and the silence of the returning soldiers 
contributed to the remaining problems of the Post-WWII Japanese consciousness of and 
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responsibility for the WWII. 
Keywords: Sino-Japanese War, Nanjing Massacre, gag order, propaganda operations. 
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